1. Janet Malcolm is a Czech-born American journalist whose parents fled their home land when she was four, in 1939. She has, for many years, been one of the leading writers on the staff of The New Yo rker magazine. A series of her articles have been turned into pro vocative and high-profile books. These have included her volume about Freudian psychiatry and the iconoclastic psychiatrist, Jeffrey Masson, entitled IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES (1984); her sharply critical assessment of the work of journalist Joe McGinniss regarding the case of convicted murderer, Jeffrey MacDonald, entitled THE JO URNALIST AND TIIE MURDERER (1990); and her biography of the marriage of Sylvia Plafu and Ted Hughes, entitled THE SILENTWOMAN (1995).
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McGough thereafter began preparing to represent Bailes at his up coming federal court trial2 on charges that he had provided false in formation to secure a bank loan and used a false social security num ber in that transaction.
While Bailes was awaiting trial, he conducted a number of business transactions out of McGough's office. These involved negotiations to sell certain allegedly still valid nineteenth-century insurance company charters that were claimed to excuse the holder from the constraints of state regulation or review.3 On June 18, 1986, two men named Frank Manfredi and Francis Boccagna agreed, through their attorney, Alan Morris, to buy two of the charters for $900,000 each with a down pay ment of $75,000 for both. They were not really the principals in this deal but were "brokers"4 for an investment banker named Kirkpatrick MacDonald. The down payment was wired into Sheila McGough's at torney trust account. McGough immediately drew the funds out of that account, transferring $70,000 to Bailes and keeping $5,000 for herself. Although Malcolm does not explore the matter in detail, other transactions involving the sale of charters also took place at around the same time.
In the late summ er of 1986, Bailes, represented by McGough, went on trial in the bank fraud case. He was convicted and sentenced to five years in federal prison.5 The story, however, was far from over. McGough redoubled her efforts on Bailes's behalf. She sought his release from prison by a variety of means. These included what one federal district judge found to be a frivolous attack on the sentence imposed upon Bailes6 as well as the instigation of a bankruptcy pro ceeding. In the bankruptcy action, one set of corporations owned by Bailes sought bankruptcy protection while another set of his shell companies requested that the court release him from prison so he could facilitate the payment of their alleged claims. Although it would appear these claims were nothing but shams, McGough worked tire lessly to effectuate the scheme.
[Vol. 98:2154 Bankruptcy Court Judge George Benson eventually consented to Bailes's release. This, however, could only be accomplished if a fed eral district court judge would agree to enter an order setting the de fendant at liberty. The first judge McGough approached, Judge Charles Richey, agreed to the release on condition that the United States Attorney's office assent. The United States Attorney was then preparing a second, much more serious case against Bailes7 and appar ently would have opposed freeing the prisoner. Rather than accept this decision or enter negotiations with the United States Attorney's office, McGough approached a second federal district court judge, Stanley Harris, concerning the matter. McGough did not inform Judge Harris of Judge Richey's prior ruling, and Harris issued an or der releasing Bailes into McGough's custody. Judge Harris rescinded this order as soon as he learned of the prior, undisclosed Richey rul ing. Judge Harris was so disturbed by McGough's behavior that he sought to have her disciplined by the District of Columbia Bar for her conduct.
In 1988, Bailes was tried in a North Carolina federal court for his efforts to sell insurance company charters.8 The government's case proved so strong and Bailes's defense so weak that in midstream he shifted to an insanity plea. That claim was rejected by the jury, and, upon conviction, Bailes was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.
In the meantime, a number of those either injured or affronted by McGough's behavior during her efforts on Bailes's behalf began civil proceedings against her. The first to proceed was the investment banker, MacDonald, who had lost $75,000 in the escrow deposit inci dent in June 1986. He brought suit against McGough in 1987 to re cover his lost funds. Included as a defendant in this action was the in surer that had provided McGough with Errors and Omissions insurance. Shortly before trial, in the fall of 1988, MacDonald settled with the insurance company, receiving $75,000. One remarkable event in the civil action was the proffer of apparently forged documents by the defense immediately before the case was to go to trial. Who had forged the documents never became clear, but the most likely candi date was Bailes. Later disclosures, however, suggested that McGough may have been involved, at least insofar as seeking to get the forgeries notarized long after their alleged execution date.
In McGough and her Errors and Omissions insurer. Wyatt described the events surrounding the proffer of the forged documents on the eve of the civil trial. Prosecutor Hulkower's overarching theory was that Sheila McGough had joined Bailes in a series of illegal scams designed to benefit both the attorney and her erstwhile client. In the govern ment's case, however, the motive for McGough's choosing to forsake the role of honest attorney and join forces with her con man client was never made entirely clear. There was some evidence (albeit thin) of a romantic attraction as well as the more prosaic suggestion that the mo tive might have been greed.
The defense strategy was to attack the credibility of the prosecu tion's key witnesses and to argue that McGough had done no more than act as a zealous lawyer on behalf of her client, Bailes. This may In the end, Malcolm concluded that McGough was an "exquisite heroine" (p. 161), "a woman of almost preternatural honesty and de cency" (p. 6), who through "the heedless selflessness that propelled her downfall has thrown into relief the radicalism of her vision of de fense law as a calling for the incorrigibly loyal" (p. 161).
II. SHOULD WE BELIEVE MALCOLM'S VERSION?
There are a number of reasons not to accept Janet Malcolm's re construction and interpretation of Sheila McGough's story. Some are contained within the story itself while others are highlighted in Judge Richard Posner's assessment of Malcolm's book in a review published in Th e New Republic in April of last year.11 The most serious charge leveled by Malcolm is that the government "framed" Sheila McGough. It is not exactly clear what this means, but Malcolm herself appears to reject the charge by declaring:
Sheila has never been able to demonstrate to me that Hulkower and his boss, Henry Hudson, knew she was innocent and prosecuted her all the same. "I can't prove it yet," she wrote in 1996, and she hasn't proved it two years later. While it seems clear to me that Morris and Manfredi and Boccagna testified falsely when they said that Sheila told them she would hold the money in escrow, it isn't at all clear that Hulkower knew this and was cynically supporting a theory he didn't believe in. I think he be lieved Sheila was Bailes's gun moll and had lied and cheated on his be half. He had never met Sheila -he didn't know what I know about her character. He professed to find my defense of her pitiful. [p. 110] With that charge out of the way, two assertions remain: first, that McGough was "almost preternaturally honest"; and second, that the explanation for her conduct was her selfless loyalty to her client.
As to the claim about McGough's honesty, the record Malcolm sets out is not completely convincing. Although Malcolm is fully satis fied on the point, she does discuss at least one instance which draws McGough's candor into question. That incident involved a man named Fred Quarles, who had made inquiries about purchasing one of Bailes's infamous insurance company charters. Quarles had pursued the matter for some time and, as part of his inquiries, eventually asked McGough where Bailes was. The question came shortly after Bailes had been imprisoned pursuant to the 1986 Virginia bank fraud convic tion. Apparently to protect the prospects of a deal and/or the reputa-tion of a client, McGough lied about Bailes's situation. As she put it when Malcolm confronted her about the matter:
"Quarles told the truth. I did mislead him," Sheila said. "What did you say!" "Yes, I told Quarles that nothing was final, that things were on appeal. That wasn't truthful. I did try to mislead him. All I can say in my de fense is that I didn't want to give out damaging information about a cli ent without his permission. A more experienced attorney would have found a better way of doing this. I didn't do it well. He took me by sur prise, and instead of a generic, lawyerlike answer like, 'Oh, I don't ever give out information about a client,' I misled him. I wasn't under oath. It wasn't illegal. But I should have done it differently." [p. 129] This anecdote suggests that truth was no real obstacle when Bailes's (and perhaps McGough's) interests were at stake. Despite this evidence, Malcolm chose to cling tenaciously to her belief that McGough was extraordinarily honest. Her spin on the Quarles matter is revealing, if unpersuasive. Malcolm says of the incident: "Her con fession to me that she had misled Quarles was only further evidence of her honesty. She could have fudged or equivocated, but she had cho sen to tell the shameful truth about herself" (p. 130). Confession may be good for the soul, but it is not proof of thoroughgoing honesty. This seems a weak defense and one that is strained beyond the breaking point when reconsidered in light of Judge Posner's disclo sures, to be considered below.
What remains of Malcolm's claims is the assertion that McGough was guided in her actions by a selfless loyalty to her client, Bob Bailes.
It is true that McGough seems, in Malcolm's telling of the story, ex traordinarily, even self-sacrificingly, loyal. Yet much of what Malcolm describes as noble loyalty may equally well be described as muddle headedness or downright stupidity. McGough took every opportunity to help her client sell his plainly suspect insurance charters, manipu late the system to escape confinement, and achieve a number of other self-serving ends. She let him pursue his dubious business out of her office and use her trust account without constraint or review. She told misleading stories on his behalf and did whatever seemed necessary to get the bankruptcy scheme to work. At a minimum, her conduct was careless and irresponsible. Even Malcolm is forced to concede: "It seems unbelievable that someone who had a law degree could be so credulous and so careless" (p. 25). Indeed, it does seem unbelievable.
None of the numerous attorneys Malcolm questioned thought McGough had acted sensibly.
Labowitz, her civil counsel, said McGough's "judgment appeared to be flawed. It is inexplicable to me what she was hoping to accomplish when she took some of the actions she took on behalf of Mr. Bailes" (p. 73). He concluded that the es crow transaction, in particular, was handled in a thoroughly unprofes- Malcolm, perhaps inadvertently, provides a number of alternatives rather than noble zeal, to explain McGough's actions. One of the most intriguing is that McGough undertook her efforts on Bailes's be half out of a sense of guilt at having botched his defense in the Virginia bank fraud case. As McGough herself put it:
"Where I blundered was to take on legal matters I wasn't prepared for," she said. "I should have just said no. It was an error of pride. I was flat tered by Bobby's trust in me. But I didn't have the proper experience, and I didn't represent him adequately." [p. 40] Another possibility is that McGough, because of her na'ivete and inex perience, was conned again and again by the artful Bailes. All of her counsel, both civil and criminal, appeared to subscribe to this notion, and it is amply supported by the reports of lawyers who, through bitter experience, were acquainted with Bob Bailes's modus operandi. Al ternatively, or in addition, McGough seemed to be experiencing se vere mental distress during this period.1 2 Her civil counsel, Kenneth Labowitz, said of his client during the run up to the 1987 civil trial:
"She was coming apart at the time of the civil case. I mean, emotion ally. It was unpleasant to watch" (p. 73). There is good reason to sus-12. I would like to thank my wife, Janice Toran, for bringing this point to my attention.
[Vol.98:2154 pect that her choices in relation to Bailes's affairs were the product of emotional pressures that deprived her of sound judgment.
Judge Richard Posner has written a lengthy review of Th e Crime of Sheila McGough.13 As a part of his assessment of the book, he under took an independent examination of the record in McGough's case. What he reports having found in that record raises additional ques tions about McGough's honesty and Janet Malcolm's interpretation of the case. Posner concludes that "the evidence taken as a whole leaves little doubt of McGough's guilt,"14 and that Malcolm's description of it should, most fairly, be described as "fiction" rather than reportage. 15 Posner notes a substantial number of instances of McGough's un truthfulness or fraud -instances not reported by Malcolm. Among these is the fact that MacDonald's lawyer in the original charter deal, a man named Blazzard, testified at McGough's trial that two weeks after the $75,000 was wired into McGough's trust account, he spoke with her and she assured him that the money was still being held in escrow in the account.16 Blazzard's testimony appears to provide independent evidence, by a credible source, of McGough's dishonesty regarding the escrow arrangement. Charges of dishonesty are reinforced, according to Posner, by McGough's denial during pretrial depositions in the MacDonald civil suit "that she had represented Bailes in connection with the sale of the insurance charters."17 Posner also notes that MacDonald's $75,000 was not the only deposit removed by McGough from her trust account and divvied up with Bailes during the course of the insurance charter scam. Two $25,000 deposits, one paid by a man named Johnson, and the other by two investors named Invin and Sali, were both removed from the account and shared out between McGough and Bailes. In both cases the depositors said they had been assured that the funds would be held in escrow until various charter deals were concluded.
When Sali sought return of his deposit, "McGough threatened to sue him and to have him arrested."18
Posner also focuses on McGough's exceedingly troubling behavior during what he calls the "fantastic scheme"19 to free Bailes by means of a bankruptcy proceeding. As he puts it: "McGough not only pre pared numerous pleadings and motions in these fraudulent proceed ings, but also procured and paid lawyers to represent the sham credi- tors."20 Judge Posner's assessment of the record raises profound ques tions about whether we should accept Malcolm's description of the matter. It seems far more likely than not that the prosecution and jury got the case right.
III. THE MORAL ACCORDING TO MALCOLM
Malcolm sees McGough21 as a paradigmatic case -one that can yield an enormous number of lessons. Malcolm's central concern is with the impact of narrative on courtroom adjudication. What courts and juries do, according to Malcolm, is hear and weigh competing nar ratives. The most convincing story is the one that wins. Malcolm sees this as profoundly dangerous because the best narrative is not neces sarily the truth. The problem starts with language itself, "which pro scribes unregulated truth-telling and requires that our utterances tell coherent, and thus never merely true, stories" (p. 4). While in most situations "the line between narration and lying is a pretty clear one" (p. 4), that is not necessarily the case in trials. The rules of evidence and the manipulations of adversarial lawyers blur the factual outline, inhibit the flow of information, and leave the decision.maker vulner able to the lure of too neat a tale. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that virtually every witness suffers those small lapses of mem ory and takes those verbal shortcuts that will make him or her vulner able to a lawyer's cross-examination and accusations of untruthfulness.
The reconstruction that takes place in the courtroom is more "like ruins than proper buildings; there is never enough solid building mate rial and always too much dust" (p. 19). Malcolm's sense is that law yers see truth as "a nuisance" (p. 26). This is particularly the case be cause "truth does not make a good story" (p. 26), and lawyers are constantly striving to fabricate the "good story," one that will win the case. In the end, what helps is used and what is problematic is dis carded. Out of this winnowing process, the lawyers shape and fashion their narratives: "Trials are won by attorneys whose stories fit, and lost by those whose stories are like the shapeless housecoat that truth, in her disdain of appearances, has chosen as her uniform" (p. 67). For Malcolm, McGough's case is an archetypical example of all this -the prosecution's story fit. The tale of a renegade lawyer who crossed the line was more attractive than the defense's hobbled contentions about loyalty, although Malcolm was convinced that the latter was indeed true. The implications, according to Malcolm, are dire: "Law stories are empty stories. They take the reader to a world entirely constructed of tendentious argument, and utterly devoid of the truth of the real world, where things are allowed to fall as they may" (pp. 78-79; emphases added). In this view, biased argument rules over the facts. There is no chance for factually based assessment, and the lawyers' reconstruc tions blot out the underlying reality. The jury is left guessing. One would think that these conclusions damn the system beyond any hope of redemption, yet Malcolm is, at least slightly, more circumspect:
The method of adversarial law is to pit two trained palterers against each other. The jury is asked to guess not which side is telling the truth -it knows that neither is -but which side is being untruthful in aid of the truth. No one has thought of a better system, but everyone who has par ticipated in it -whether as defendant, defense lawyer, plaintiff, plain tiff's lawyer, prosecutor, judge, or juror -has gained a sense of its cyni cism and absurdism. [p. 79] These are weighty charges. It is hard to know what to make of the ca veat "no one has thought of a better system," but implicit in Malcolm's argument would seem to be the suggestion that any procedure which leaves participants with a sense that the process is a cynical hoax and essentially absurd cannot be one that is likely to endure.
Malcolm draws several further lessons from her examination of McGough's case. She sees in McGough's story a set of insights about lawyers. The key to legal success is the ability to tell a good story, and those who can best manipulate the evidence triumph. Such is the case with McGough's prosecutor, Mark Hulkower. When faced with fac tual inconsistencies, he simply designed an effective cover story: "[I]n [his] capable hands ... the narrative beautifully held. Hulkower sim ply wouldn't allow the inconsistencies to impede the progress of his story" (p. 24). The silver-tongued advocate, something of a stock character, triumphs and dooms his less talented opponents to defeat. In this world, the merits are of little importance, and the lawyer's cun ning is all that really counts -a cynical insight, indeed! Lawyers are not only amoral mouthpieces, they are self-serving as well. Lawyers "will do almost anything to stay in [judges'] favor" (p. 112). One sees this most clearly, according to Malcolm, at side-bar conferences. In remarks apparently adapted from her own brief essay in a book based on a Yale Law School symposium,22 Malcolm says that at sidebars "lawyers drop their masks of antagonism and behave like schoolboys in front of the teacher, vying ... to impress her" (p. 113). This sycophancy signals a deep disloyalty to or, as Malcolm puts it, Rochon, too, "subtly undermined Sheila" in his remarks to Malcolm and, hence, joined Kohlman in the ranks of betrayers. As Malcolm sees it, in a system dedicated to dissembling narratives, it is not sur prising to find lawyers who pay no more than lip service to their cli ents.
Malcolm's third major target is the jury. McGough's jury is de picted as shamefully uninterested in getting at the truth in the case be fore them. After six hours of deliberations, at least part of which were held on the day before Thanksgiving, they decided to convict on four teen of the fifteen charges. Malcolm suggests (without any cited evi dence) that their motivation for deciding was a desire to get on with holiday grocery shopping. She later suggests that the same jurors (again without any articulated proof) disregarded the testimony of a particular black defense witness because they were an "all-white Alexandria [Virginia] jury" and that similar "testimony might have impressed a New York jury" (p. 36). All of this is consistent with Malcolm's vision of the jury system in general. Late in her book, she writes:
The jury system is posited on the idea that people are capable of sus pending their normal state of having a fixed opinion about everything and allowing new ideas to penetrate the defenses of their old ones. But this is like believing people capable of suspending the peristaltic motion of their stomachs. It is like imagining a ballpark filled with placidly neu tral spectators. Every juror listens to the testimony through the filter of his preconceptions and as a (conscious or unconscious) rooter for one side or the other. The recognition of this actuality is what gives jury se lection its tense atmosphere and has, in our culture of store-bought horse sense, created an industry of experts on jury selection, to whom each side now runs for help whenever it can afford to do so. [p. 131] In the end, Malcolm constructs, out of her reading of McGough's case, a devastating portrait of the justice system: beguiled by stories, misled by lawyers, and in the hands of dogmatically closed-minded jurors.
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IV. DOES MALCOLM GET IT RIGHT?
Malcolm's work does touch a nerve. Ours is a time seemingly pre occupied with the idea of narrative. The importance of stories to cases has even been remarked on by the United States Supreme Court. In the 1997 decision, Old Chief v. United States,23 Justice Souter, writing for a closely divided court, emphasized the importance of judicial rec ognition "of the offering party's need for evidentiary richness and nar rative integrity in presenting a case." 2 4 The lawyers on each side of a criminal case are, according to the Court, entitled to tell their stories, more or less, in their own way. Their evidentiary offerings are to be treated as having a "force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning. " 2 5 The natural and appropriate result of each lawyer's storytelling is that "as its pieces come together, a narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences ... necessary to reach an honest verdict. " 2 6 The prosecution's obligation in criminal cases transcends a syllogistic pres entation to encompass the telling of "a story of guiltiness." 2 7
All of this seems to verify Malcolm's charge that the law cares more for stories than for truth. Yet, Old Chief is not a case empow ering lawyers as storytellers, but one imposing limits on the scope of storytelling. The Court bars the prosecution's introduction of a somewhat detailed description of the defendant's prior conviction and insists on the use of a defense-proffered stipulation in its place. 2 8 This was done to avoid prejudice and discourage jurors from formulating too potent a story regarding the defendant's past.
Malcolm uses the story of Sheila McGough to indict storytelling in the courtroom. In the burgeoning literature on storytelling, there has been a robust debate about the merits of attacking the legal system by means of stories. 2 9 One needs to search no further than the dispute about the story of Stella Liebeck's injury after dousing herself with an extremely hot cup of coffee purchased at McDonald's,30 to glimpse the These criticisms of Malcolm's anecdotalization of the McGough trial might be read to suggest that when the legal system itself places reliance on stories, narratives, or anecdotes at trial, it courts disaster. The answer to this argument requires an assessment of precisely how adjudicators use narratives and how narratives interact with the un derlying facts of a case. Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie argue that jurors decide the complex questions posed in lawsuits by fashioning narratives. 3 7 According to this theory, jurors construct a "causal model, " or narrative, to explain the available proof. This model is then matched with the decision options made available through legal instructions. The best match forms the basis for decision. It is impor tant to note, however, that the causal model, or narrative, is not fabri cated independently of the proof but, rather, premised upon it. The process of narrative formulation is not the product of the lawyers' ef forts but a construction undertaken by each juror. The construction is a synthetical process that has regard for the evidence and legal rules as well as for prior juror experience. Once each juror has fashioned a narrative, he or she is required to harmonize it with the similar efforts of all the other jurors. No individual's story dictates the outcome.
The question remains whether jurors pay adequate attention to the facts presented to them. While there is no surefire way to answer this question, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeise!, in their seminal work Th e American Jury, concluded that "the jury by and large does understand the case and get it straight, and ... the evidence itself is a major de terminant of the decision." 3 8 Moreover, in almost four cases out of every five studied, judge and jury independently came to the same verdict -a rate of agreement superior to that of professionals facing a 
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range of other decisional tasks.39 Based on these findings, as well as on subsequent research, a number of prominent social scientists have concluded that the weight and directionality of evidence are the pre ponderant determinants of jury verdicts. As Richard Lempert puts it: "A considerable body of research indicates that even when aspects of a case might appeal to the prejudices of jurors, unless the case is oth erwise close on the facts, the evidence dominates."40 Lempert cites a study by Christie Visher supporting this proposition.41 Visher, in tum, cites several more to the same effect.42 These conclusions are reiter ated by Michael Saks who states: "Studies that have pitted trial evi dence and arguments against what jurors bring with them to court usually find that the trial information carries far more weight."43 Similarly, Shari Diamond concludes: "In studies that have measured the contributions of juror characteristics and trial testimony to jury verdicts, the trial testimony dominates."44 In the end, the empirical re search suggests that evidence is key and that narrative construction is driven by it. While it is a leap from these observations to concluding that jurors find the truth, we have solid evidence for joining with Aristotle in arguing: "things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites."45 Several of Malcolm's charges remain to be considered, including two against lawyers: first, that they are silver-tongued tricksters who, by twisting the evidence get their way; and second, that they generally betray their clients. As to the first, the above-cited social science ma terials indicate very serious limits on the power of lawyers to affect outcomes. This question was one that Kalven and Zeisel attempted to assess. Their key findings are that counsel have only an extremely modest impact on decisions and that lawyers are evenly matched more than three-quarters of the time. [Vol.98:2154 attribution of particular persuasive power to the prosecutor with a brilliant narrative approach must be treated with a good deal of skep ticism, at least as an indictment of the entire justice system. The accusation regarding betrayal is far harder to deal with as it is intimately bound up with our reactions to Sheila McGough's story. If McGough is a shining paragon of loyalty, then her story stands as a se rious accusation against a legal profession that cannot recognize no bility or abide devotion. If, on the other hand, McGough is little more than an emotionally troubled and inexperienced lawyer who made grievous mistakes in attempting to help a conniving client, then there is little need to defend McGough's lawyers or the system of which they are a part. The betrayal/loyalty question, however, has a larger di mension.
Modem criminal defense lawyers confront the dilemma of loyalty on a regular basis. Defense counsel are expected to act with warm zeal on behalf of their clients,47 to render them loyal service,48 and to guard client confidences.49 Yet, the criminal law regarding accessories "forbids a lawyer from intentionally assisting a client in committing a crime."50 What this restriction means is a hotly disputed question. This prolonged legal battle must have been both embarrassing and wearing for Malcolm. The only real hero, from Malcolm's point of view, would have been the stalwart district court judge who, through more than a decade, steered the case to the result he had early on con cluded was warranted on the merits. Both appellate judges and juries must have appeared fickle from Malcolm's perspective. In light of this grueling and all-too-public experience, it would not be surprising if
Malcolm were attracted to a version of McGough's story that empha sized jury incompetence, lawyer perfidy, legal ineptitude, and the cynical conclusion that the litigation process is absurd. The only "hero" in Malcolm's case was Judge Lynch, and it is remarkable how gently Malcolm treats virtually every trial judge connected to the McGough story, even those who testified against her at her criminal Malcolm's experience may help explain why she saw the
McGough case the way she did.
The one remaining piece of Malcolm's work that seems to call for explanation is its particular emphasis on the baleful effect of narrative. At least some of this may be traced to Malcolm's participation in the 1995 Yale conference. The papers presented at that meeting were ed ited into a book entitled Law's Stories,14 which was published by the Yale University Press in 1996. Of that book, the seemingly ubiquitous Judge Posner has written:
Remarkably, considering that the book is intended to showcase this new movement that I am calling legal narratology, the overall tone of Law's Stories is skeptical and critical, even defensive. Criticisms and expres sions of doubt outweigh praise and claims of insight, and the criticisms are more convincing than the praise. 75
It should come as no surprise that out of this critical assessment of narrative, Malcolm might have formulated a rather jaundiced view of courtroom storytelling. When the McGough case came along, it may have seemed custom-made to challenge legal narrative because of the prosecution's smooth presentation and the defendant's refusal to al low a neat story to be told on her behalf.
In a brief essay in Law's Stories, Malcolm set out to analyze side bar conferences. As in her book on McGough, she notes a feeling of "betrayal" as each lawyer's "mask suddenly dropped"76 during the side-bar. Curiously, however, her overarching view of the system ap pears more benign in the Yale piece. She praises the side-bar declar ing:
But in relegating to a private place the trial antagonists' negotiations over the limits of storytelling -over the containment of hating and blaming within crisp rules of procedure (the rules of fair play) -the law restores something of what it has taken. By so clearly denoting what is backstage and what is onstage, by keeping the illusion-destroying activi ties of backstage firmly hidden, the law, with a kind of moving clumsi ness, signals its acknowledgment of a possibly higher power than its own: the power of the imagination.77
By the time Malcolm reached the end of her work on Sheila McGough's case, she appears to have lost her respect for trials, narra tives, and "the power of imagination." Her disillusionment is to be re gretted. Its basis is somewhat mysterious. Its consequence, however, is the prejudicing of a canny observer who has, in the past, helped us 
